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ABSTRACT 
The  relationship  between  financial  incentives  and  performance, 
long of interest to social scientists, has gained new relevance with 
the advent of web-based “crowd-sourcing” models of production. 
Here we investigate the effect of compensation on performance in 
the  context  of  two  experiments,  conducted  on  Amazon’s 
Mechanical  Turk  (AMT).  We  find  that  increased  financial 
incentives  increase  the  quantity,  but  not  the  quality,  of  work 
performed by participants, where the difference appears to be due 
to  an  “anchoring”  effect:  workers  who  were  paid  more  also 
perceived the value of their work to be greater, and thus were no 
more  motivated  than  workers  paid  less.  In  contrast  with 
compensation  levels,  we  find  the  details  of  the  compensation 
scheme do matter—specifically, a “quota” system results in better 
work  for  less  pay  than  an  equivalent  “piece  rate”  system.  
Although  counterintuitive,  these  findings  are  consistent  with 
previous laboratory studies, and may have real-world analogs as 
well.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences – 
sociology, economics.  
General Terms 
Management, Performance, Economics, Experimentation, Human 
Factors. 
Keywords 
Incentives,  Performance,  Crowd-sourcing,  Peer  Production, 
Mechanical Turk 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most exciting and potentially transformative features 
of the World Wide Web is its ability to connect large numbers of 
otherwise disparate individuals who wish to contribute to a joint 
project  or  community  [1-3].  This  general  movement  towards 
online “peer production,” manifests itself in examples as varied as 
open  source  software,  Wikipedia,  and  social  tagging  sites  like 
Flickr and Del.icio.us. One important sub-class of peer production 
is  a  phenomenon  known  as  “crowd-sourcing”  [4,  5]  in  which 
potentially large jobs are broken into many small tasks that are 
then  outsourced  directly  to  individual  workers  via  public 
solicitation. Workers sometimes work for free, motivated either 
out of intrinsic enjoyment [3] or some form of social reward [6]; 
however, successful examples of volunteer crowd sourcing have 
proven difficult to replicate, in part because arbitrary tasks tend 
not  to  be  intrinsically  enjoyable,  and  in  part  because  social 
rewards  are  often  highly  context  specific.  As  a  result,  crowd 
sourcing  increasingly  uses  financial  compensation,  often  in  the 
form of micro-payments on the order of a few cents per task. This 
model has the advantage that it is more replicable than models 
based on intrinsic or social rewards; yet it can still accomplish 
tasks quickly and cheaply. As a result, paid crowd-sourcing has 
elicited considerable interest as an alternative mode of production 
to  traditional  firms  [4].  Nevertheless,  the  success  of  any  given 
enterprise still depends to some extent on the ability of would-be 
“employers” to attract the appropriate workers and motivate them 
to  perform  the  task  well.  Although  novel  in  some  important 
respects,  therefore,  the  crowd-sourcing  model  is  faced  with  a 
question that has long concerned economists, psychologists, and 
management  theorists;  that  is,  whether  and  how  financial 
incentives can be used to motivate workplace performance.  
Related  work.  Traditional  economic  theory  has  generally 
espoused the view that rational workers will choose to improve 
their  performance  in  response  to  a  scheme  that  rewards  such 
improvements with financial gain [7, 8].  This “rational choice” 
view  is  increasingly  reflected  in  management  practice—for 
example,  the  fraction  of  executive  compensation  that  is  tied  to 
stock price has increased dramatically in recent decades [9, 10]—
and has also been supported by a small number of field studies. 
Most notably, Lazear [8] conducted a study of a large “autoglass” 
factory in which workers installed windshields on a production 
line that switched from a time-rate wage (i.e., pay per hour) to a 
piece-rate (i.e., pay per unit) over the course of a year and a half. 
Lazear found that individual productivity for workers who started 
in  the  time-rate  scheme  and  switched  to  the  piece-rate  scheme 
increased  by  20%,  leading  him  to  conclude  that  performance-
based  pay  schemes  are  a  powerful  tool  for  eliciting  improved 
performance.   
As many psychologists and management theorists have pointed 
out,  however,  results  of  this  kind  do  not  tell  the  whole  story.  
Numerous  experiments  have  demonstrated  that  under  certain 
circumstances the provision of financial incentives can undermine 
“intrinsic  motivation”  (e.g.  enjoyment,  desire  to  help  out), 
possibly  leading  to  poorer  outcomes  [11,  12].    Alternatively, 
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have accomplished pre-set targets [13]. Even in situations where 
financial  incentives  do  increase  motivation,  moreover,  recent 
experiments  have  demonstrated  that  they  may  still  undermine 
actual performance through what is called a “choking effect” [14].  
Finally,  for  more  complex  tasks,  where  performance  is 
multifaceted and often hard to measure, performance-based pay 
schemes can undermine performance in other ways—for example, 
by encouraging workers to focus only on the aspects of their jobs 
that  are  actively  measured  [15];  to  free-ride  on  the  efforts  of 
others [7]; to avoid making colleagues look bad [16], or to avoid 
taking risks, thereby hampering innovation [17, 18].  
The present work. Here we investigate the relationship between 
financial  compensation  and  performance  in  two  experiments 
conducted  on  a  particular  crowd-sourcing  platform,  Amazon’s 
Mechanical  Turk  (see  https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome). 
Before describing the experiments in detail, we note that AMT 
offers some interesting advantages (and some limitations) as an 
environment  within  which  to  conduct  experimental  behavioral 
science.  In particular, AMT can be used to create a reasonably 
flexible  and  lightweight  experimental  framework  that  allows 
experimenters to conduct a wide range of experiments involving 
potentially  large  numbers  of  participants  (hundreds  or  even 
thousands, but probably not millions) quickly and cheaply.  These 
features are particularly helpful in the current context, where we 
would like to assign participants to a relatively high number of 
experimental  conditions,  as  well  as  check  the  robustness  of 
findings by varying either the information environment, or even 
the task itself.  Although these manipulations would be possible in 
a traditional lab setting, by running the experiments on AMT the 
time  and  cost  is  much  lower  and  the  results  pertain  to  a  real 
(though atypical) labor market.  Nonetheless, the use of an online 
platform also brings with it certain restrictions with respect to the 
type of experiments that can be conducted, and raises some novel 
challenges regarding subject recruitment and retention.   
Outline and Main Contributions. The remainder of the paper 
proceeds  as  follows.  In  the  next  section,  we  describe  the 
Mechanical  Turk  platform,  and  discuss  in  more  detail  its 
advantages  and  limitations  as  an  experimental  platform.    In 
Sections  3  and  4,  we  then  describe  two  experiments  that  we 
conducted  on  AMT  to  investigate  the  relationship  between 
financial  incentives  and  performance.    Section  3  describes  an 
experiment in which subjects were asked to sort up to 99 sets of 
images of moving traffic into their correct temporal order, where 
subjects were assigned randomly to one of three difficulty levels 
and  one  of  three  rates  of  pay,  yielding  nine  experimental 
conditions in all.   Section 4 then describes a second experiment, 
in which subjects solved up to 24 word puzzles, each of which 
required them to locate target words in a two-dimensional grid of 
letters, and where they were compensated either on a “per word” 
or a “per puzzle” basis. Given the distinct nature of the tasks in 
these experiments, it is not surprising that we found somewhat 
different results; however, two basic findings seem robust: first, 
that paying subjects elicited higher output than not paying them 
(where in the case of experiment one, increasing their pay rate 
also  yielded  higher  output);  and  second,  that  in  contrast  to  the 
quantity  of  work  done,  paying  subjects  did  not  affect  their 
accuracy.  Although surprising, this latter result may be related to 
an “anchoring effect” [19-21] in that subjects’ perception of the 
value of their work was strongly correlated with their actual pay 
rate.  In section 5, we discuss the implications of these results and 
point  out  some  important  similarities  and  differences  with  the 
existing literature on financial incentives and performance. 
2.  Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
The original purpose for Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) was 
to serve as a programmatic interface for tasks that were easier for 
humans than for machines; however, it can equally be considered 
a labor market in which “requestors,” who can be individuals or 
corporations, can list tasks (called “human intelligence tasks,” or 
HITs) along with a specified compensation. Individual workers 
can then elect to complete any number of these tasks for which 
they are then paid by the corresponding requestor.  
When choosing a task to work on, workers are presented with a 
list of “requests,” each of which contains the title of the job being 
offered,  the  reward  being  offered  per  HIT,  and  the  number  of 
HITs available for that request. Workers can click on a link to 
view a brief description of the task, or can request a preview of 
the HIT.  After seeing the preview, workers can choose to accept 
the HIT, at which point the work is officially assigned to them and 
they can begin completing the task.  HITs range widely in size 
and  nature,  requiring  from  seconds  to  hours  to  complete,  and 
compensation varies accordingly, but is typically on the order of 
$0.01-$0.10 per HIT. Currently, several hundred requests may be 
available  on  any  given  day,  representing  tens  of  thousands  of 
HITs  (i.e.  a  single  request  may  comprise  hundreds  or  even 
thousands  of  individual  HITs);  thus  while  AMT  is  only  one 
particular instantiation of the crowd sourcing model, its size and 
diversity make it an attractive object of study. 
As we have already noted, the Mechanical Turk framework can 
also  be  thought  of  as  a  convenient  pool  of  subjects  willing  to 
participate  in  laboratory-style  behavioral  experiments  for  a 
relatively  low  fee  (where  the  nature  of  the  experiments  are 
appropriately  disclosed).  For  the  specific  research  question  at 
hand—the  relationship  between  financial  incentives  and 
performance—a  major  advantage  of  adopting  an  experimental 
approach is that it allows us to eliminate many of the confounding 
effects that arise in real-life employment contexts, such as free-
riding, risk-avoidance, or group interaction effects. The degree of 
control over the task, setting, and incentive structure also allows 
us to restrict attention to a single aspect of the overall relation 
between financial incentives and performance—namely whether 
simply increasing the rate of compensation for a given task leads 
to better performance. 
Generalizing  results  from  the  crowd-sourcing  context  to  the 
offline context requires caution, however, as there are at least two 
potentially important differences between the two contexts; thus 
one  might  suspect  that  studies  conducted  on  AMT  may  lack 
external  validity.    The  first  difference  is  that  the  highly  self-
selected  AMT  population  may  not  be  representative  of  the 
population  at  large,  both  because  it  is  an  exclusively  online 
environment,  and  also  because  of  the  unconventional  nature  of 
“labor”  being  provided.  Fortunately,  one  advantage  of  our 
particular study design is that individuals are randomly assigned 
to  different  payment  conditions;  thus  whatever  differences  we 
observe  across  conditions  is  attributable  to  the  conditions 
themselves, net of whatever selection biases are responsible for 
people participating in the first place.  Also, as we show below, 
our subject pool is surprisingly diverse, consistent with previous 
studies. 
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smaller (cents per task) than would typically be the case in lab 
experiments, and trivial compared with traditional labor markets.  
One might therefore suspect that participants in our experiments 
will not respond in a sensible way to incentives because they are 
motivated primarily by non-financial incentives, or are simply not 
taking  the  work  seriously.  As  we  discuss  later,  the  issue  of 
motivation may indeed pose some problems for external validity, 
and certainly invites further study. We note, however, that recent 
research has indicated that the quality of work performed on AMT 
is  as  good,  and  maybe  even  better  than,  work  performed  by 
experts  paid  under  traditional  contracting  arrangements  [22], 
indicating that it is being taken seriously.  Moreover, and more 
importantly  for  our  purposes,  we  show  that  in  at  least  some 
instances subjects do in fact respond sensibly to wage differences, 
suggesting  that  there  is  some  external  validity  to  the  effects 
observed in crowd-sourcing contexts. 
3.  STUDY 1: IMAGE ORDERING 
3.1  Methods 
To understand the impact of compensation on performance, we 
wish  to  differentiate  between  the  quantity  of  work  performed 
(output) and the quality of the work (accuracy); thus we require a 
task  for  which  output  can  vary  widely  and  accuracy  can  be 
measured objectively. To meet these criteria, we created a task in 
which  participants  sorted  a  set  of  images  taken  from  a  traffic 
camera at 2-second intervals into chronological order.  
3.1.1  Design 
To participate in the study, participants were required to have an 
account  on  Amazon’s  Mechanical  Turk.    These  accounts  are 
associated with a unique ID (which is, in turn, associated with a 
bank  account),  so  it  is  possible  to  ensure  each  account  (and 
therefore most likely, each person) only participates once.  The 
study,  which  was  listed  among  other  tasks  posted  by  other 
requesters,  had  the  title,  “Reorder  traffic  images,”  and  was 
described as “Sort images from traffic cameras in chronological 
order”,  with  a  base  rate  pay  of  $0.10.    If  examined  further, 
participants  could  see  a  preview  of  the  HIT  (Figure  1),  which 
included a description of the task and an example of the images to 
be  sorted  along  with  the  correct  order.  Some  participants  were 
informed that they would be paid an additional bonus for each set 
of images sorted, and for others there was no such indication.  If 
participants accepted the task, they were asked (but not required) 
to provide some demographic information, and then were given a 
chance to practice sorting images. All participants were paid an 
initial  fee  of  $0.10  to  complete  the  introductory  survey  and 
training set, and all received the same three practice sets of three 
images, displayed in the same (incorrect) order. To sort an image 
set, participants clicked on the photo they wished to reorder and 
dragged it into the correct position.  When they felt the images 
were  correctly  sorted  in  chronological  order  from  left  to  right, 
they pressed a button to submit their sorting and proceed to the 
next image set.  During the practice trials, after submitting each 
image  set  they  received  feedback  on  whether  the  images  were 
correctly  sorted,  and  if  not,  what  the  correct  order  was.  
Participants  were  informed  that  the  feedback  would  only  be 
available during the practice trials.  
After  completing  the  practice  trials,  participants  were  given 
information  about  how  much  they  would  be  paid,  and  were 
randomly assigned to a difficulty level: easy (2 images per set), 
medium (3 images) and hard (4 images), and to one of four pay 
levels: no pay, low pay ($0.01 per image set), medium pay ($0.05 
per image set); and high pay ($0.10 per image set). They were 
also  informed  that  by  continuing,  they  were  consenting  to 
participate  in  an  experiment;  however,  there  was  no  indication 
that the difficulty or payments, either the manner or the amount, 
would  be  different  for  anyone  else  engaging  in  the  task.  
Participants could sort any number from 0 to 99 sets of images, 
where  the  number  of  image  sets  they  chose  to  sort  was  our 
measure of quantity, and their accuracy in sorting the images was 
our measure of quality.  At any point, they could choose to finish 
and accept the bonus (if any) for the tasks so far completed.  Once 
they chose to finish sorting image sets, or if they sorted all 99 
image  sets,  they  were  asked  to  complete  a  brief  questionnaire 
about their performance.  After this, the participants were given 
feedback about the number of tasks completed and could submit 
their work to receive payment. 
3.1.2  Participants 
Over  all  conditions,  the  experiment  involved  611  participants, 
who sorted a total of 36,425 image sets. Participants were asked to 
report  their  current  location,  and  594  participants  identified  43 
different countries.  The majority (82.7%) was from the United 
States, and the next four highest responding countries were India 
(6.4%),  Canada  (1.5%),  Vietnam  (1.2%),  and  United  Kingdom 
(1%)  Asked  to  report  their  gender,  563  participants  responded, 
and of these 58.8% were female and 41.2% were male.  Of the 
568 reporting age, the average response was 33.3 years and the 
median age was 31 years. Participants were given a choice of five 
income  levels  to  report,  and  of  the  598  who  offered  the 
information, 18.6% reported an income less than $7000, 22.6% 
reported an income between $7 - $30k, 34.5% reported an income 
between $30 - $70k, 21.1% reported an income between $70 - 
Figure 1. Screenshot of the description of Study 1, 
which participants saw when deciding to participate in 
the experiment. 
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subject  pool  was  therefore  reasonably  diverse,  consistent  with 
previous  user  surveys  of  the  AMT  population—for  example, 
http://behind-the-enemy-lines.blogspot.com/2008/03/mechanical-
turk-demographics.html  describes  a  similar  income  and  gender 
distribution, and also recorded 58% female respondents. 
3.2  Results 
Figure 2 reveals two main findings: first, that across all difficulty 
levels participants chose to complete more tasks on average when 
the pay was higher (F(3,607) = 15.73, p < 0.001); and second, that 
across  all  payment  levels,  the  number  of  completed  tasks 
decreased with increasing difficulty. We also observe, however, 
that there is no interaction between difficulty and compensation, 
thus hereafter we focus on the effect of pay on quantity averaged 
over difficulty levels. In addition to the average effect of pay, we 
also  found  that  more  of  the  participants  paid  $0.10  sorted  the 
maximum possible than those paid $0.01 or nothing at all, and 
proportionately more of the participants paid $0.01 sorted fewer 
than  10  sets.  These  results,  in  other  words,  are  completely 
consistent with standard economic theory, which predicts that the 
more a person is paid to do X, the more of X they will do [7, 8]. 
Nevertheless, the finding is reassuring since, as noted above, one 
might have expected that variability in intrinsic motivation (e.g. 
enjoyment  of  the  task)  would  have  overwhelmed  the  effect  of 
changes in extrinsic motivation (payment), which can vary by at 
most  $0.10  per  task.  The  strong  and  significant  dependence  of 
output on compensation therefore suggests that the range of wage 
rates studied ought to be sufficient to observe variability in the 
quality of performance as well.     
As Figure 3 indicates, however, increasing compensation did not 
improve accuracy, which we measured in two ways: first, using 
the  proportion  of  image  sets  that  were  sorted  into  the  correct 
order; and second, using Spearman’s rank correlation (ρ), which is 
the  normalized  sum  of  squared  differences  between  the  correct 
order  and  the  sorted  order.  For  each  accuracy  measure,  we 
confirmed quantitatively what is visually apparent in Figure 3 in 
two ways: first, using a simple one-way analysis of variance; and 
second, fitting the data to a hierarchical linear model (where again 
we averaged our results over the three difficulty levels). Although 
the  number  of  tasks  each  participant  completed  can  only  be 
analyzed  at  the  participant  level,  the  measures  of  accuracy  can 
also  be  analyzed  at  the  task  level;  thus,  the  hierarchical  linear 
model  [23],  also  known  as  a  multi-level  model,  is  a  useful 
statistical  model  because  it  accounts  for  the  variability  in  the 
inherent  difficulty  of  sorting  each  image  set,  and  the  variable 
number of tasks each participant completed. In this analysis, the 
compensation  offered  is  treated  as  a  categorical  variable  and 
modeled as a random effect simultaneously with user-level effects 
and task-level effects. Specifically, when accuracy is defined as 
the  probability  Pr(yi =1)   that  the  image  set  i   was  sorted 
correctly, the model is 
Pr(yi =1)= logit
−1(αt[i] +βt[i] ⋅ payi +ηu[i]) , 
and when accuracy is defined as Spearman’s rank correlation (ρ) 
between the actual and correct ordering, the model is  
€ 
ˆ  ρ =αt[i] + βt[i]⋅ payi +ηu[i], 
where in both cases αt[i] is the intercept for each task, βt[i] is the 
slope for the wage received, and ηu[i] ~ N(0,σ) is the intercept for 
each  user.  The  parameters  α  and  η  therefore  capture  variance 
among  different  tasks  and  respondents  respectively,  and  β 
captures the effects of the wage rate. 
  Model estimate  β ( )  95% Confidence Interval 
$0.00  0.059  (-0.055, 0.173) 
$0.01  -0.124  (-0.220, -0.029) 
$0.05  -0.057  (-0.154, 0.041) 
$0.10  0.086  (-0.0044, 0.1775) 
Table 1. Average parameter estimates for the effect of 
pay in the hierarchical linear model across users.   
 
. 
 
 
Figure 3. Accuracy, defined as the proportion of image 
sets correctly sorted, is not reliably different for 
different wages; error bars are standard error. 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of image sets sorted in Study 1 increases 
with wage rate and decreases with difficult of task; error 
bars are standard error.  
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found  that  the  wage  rate  had  no  significant  effect  on  the 
participants’ accuracy in sorting the image sets. First, as indicated 
in Table 1, the parameter estimates in the hierarchical model for 
the four levels of pay were not reliably different from each other; 
and second, one-way ANOVAs of wage rate on proportion correct 
and  rank  correlation  were  not  statistically  reliable  (proportion 
correct: F(3,607) = 0.66, ns; rank correlation: F(3,607) = 0.82, ns).  
3.3  Discussion 
One possible explanation for the absence of an effect of wages on 
accuracy  is  that  subjects  simply  assumed  they  would  be  paid 
regardless of performance. This explanation is somewhat unlikely, 
as AMT’s policy is that requestors are only obligated to pay for 
accurate or useful work, and workers are informed of the policy. 
Nevertheless,  to  check  the  possibility  we  ran  an  additional 
experiment  with  a  single  payment  level  ($0.01)  that  provided 
different information to participants regarding the importance of 
accuracy.  In this additional experiment, some participants were 
given the same instructions as before while others were told that 
one out of every four image sets was a test image set used to 
gauge their accuracy.  Within this latter condition, we also created 
four variants: (i) participants only informed that accuracy would 
be  measured;  (ii)  participants  also  shown  feedback  on  their 
accuracy after every fourth image set; (iii) participants also told 
explicitly that their pay would be contingent on their performance; 
and (iv) participants shown feedback and also told that pay was 
contingent.  We  found  that  quantity  and  quality  results  were 
indistinguishable  in  all  these  conditions,  suggesting  that 
participants  in  all  conditions  were  in  fact  treating  their  pay  as 
performance dependent.   
 Although the differential effect of pay on quantity and quality is 
at first puzzling, we note that previous studies have also found 
positive  effects  of  financial  incentives  on  quantity  of  work 
performed  but  no  effect  on  quality  [24].  We  hypothesize, 
moreover, that the difference derives from an “anchoring” effect, 
similar  to  effects  that  have  been  observed  in  other  domains  of 
judgment and decision-making [19-21]. As Figure 4 shows, when 
surveyed  after  the  completion  of  their  tasks,  workers  in  all 
conditions generally felt that the appropriate compensation for the 
work  they  had  just  performed  was  greater  than  what  they  had 
received, but the values they expressed depended significantly (χ
2 
= 243.61, p < 0.0001) on their actual compensation: on average, 
workers paid $0.01 per task felt they should have received $0.05; 
workers  who  were  paid  $0.05  felt  they  should  have  received 
$0.08; and workers who were paid and $0.10 felt they should have 
received $0.13. On the one hand, therefore, paying people more to 
perform a task makes that task more attractive relative to their 
available  outside  options,  such  as  other  HITs  on  AMT;  thus 
subjects in the higher pay conditions stayed longer and completed 
more tasks than those in low pay condition.  On the other hand, 
because of the anchoring effect, all workers felt like they were 
being paid less than they deserved; thus were no more motivated 
to perform better no matter how much they were actually paid.  
4.  STUDY 2: WORD PUZZLES 
4.1  Methods 
In spite of this explanation, one might suspect that the absence of 
an  effect  on  accuracy  may  be  an  artifact  of  the  task  itself—
because, for example, it allowed only a small number of potential 
solutions (in the “easy” condition, for example, only two solutions 
were possible); or because subjects could not easily improve the 
quality  of  their  answers  with  greater  effort.  To  address  this 
possibility,  we  performed  another  experiment,  using  a  similar 
experimental  design,  but  changing  the  task  to  finding  words 
hidden in a random array of letters (see Figure 5). 
4.1.1  Design 
For each puzzle, we provided a list of words that might be found 
in  the  puzzle,  although  only  a  subset  of  the  list  was  actually 
hidden in the word puzzle.  As before, this task allowed us to 
measure  quantity  (number  of  puzzles  completed)  and  quality 
(fraction of words found per puzzle) independently; but because 
participants did not know how many words from the list could 
Figure 4. Post-hoc survey shows perceived value of the 
task increases with the actual pay, but is always slightly 
greater than the actual pay received.  
 
. 
 
 
Figure 5. Screenshot of Study 2.  Participants found 
words hidden in a grid of letters. 
 
. 
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had found all the words. Also as before, we randomly allocated 
participants  to  different  experimental  conditions,  where  in 
addition  to  varying  compensation  levels  we  also  created  two 
distinct  compensation  schemes  [cf.  25]—a  “quota”  scheme,  in 
which individuals were told they would be paid for every puzzle 
successfully completed, and a “piece rate” scheme in which they 
were  paid  for  every  word  found.  Within  each  compensation 
scheme, we once again created three pay levels—low, medium, 
and  high—as  well  as  a  no  pay  condition.  In  total,  therefore, 
Experiment 2 comprised 7 distinct experimental conditions. 
The recruitment of participants was the same as in Study 1, with 
the exception that the title was “Solve Word Jumble puzzles,” and 
the description now read, “Try to find words hidden in a jumble of 
letters.”  If participants previewed the HIT, they saw a description 
of  the  task  that  included  a  small  example  puzzle  and  a  brief 
description  of  the  task.    If  participants  accepted  the  task,  they 
were asked to complete a demographics questionnaire, and then 
were given more detailed instructions about how to do the task. 
For  each  puzzle,  there  was  a  list  of  15  words,  some  of  which 
could be found in the array of letters.  The puzzles had between 7-
14 hidden words, with a median of 11 hidden words per puzzle. 
To select a word, participants would click on the start and end of a 
word, after which the word would appear in a panel on the right 
and the word would remain highlighted (see Figure 5).  Once they 
felt they had found all of the hidden words, they could click a 
button to continue to the next puzzle.   
Participants would encounter one of two practice puzzles, each 
with  12  hidden  words.  If  participants  tried  to  continue  before 
successfully finding at least 8 of the words, they were asked to 
continue finding words. Once they had found at least 8 words in 
the practice puzzle, they received feedback informing how many 
words they could have found and how many they had found.  At 
this point they were also informed how much they would be paid 
(if at all), whether the payment would be by puzzle or by word, 
and  that  if  they  continued  they  were  giving  their  consent  to 
participate in an experiment. Again, there was no indication that 
the manner or amount of pay would be any different for anyone 
else.    Participants  were  informed  that  they  could  complete  as 
many puzzles as they liked, up to a maximum of 24 puzzles.  If 
the participant chose to continue, they could then take as much 
time as they wanted on each puzzle, and once they felt they had 
found all of the words, they could move on to the next puzzle.  At 
any point they could choose to finish and collect their payment.  If 
they chose to finish, or if they completed all 24 puzzles, they were 
asked to complete a brief post-task questionnaire, and then were 
given feedback on their performance and could submit their work 
for payment. 
4.1.2  Participants 
Over  all  conditions,  320  participants  solved  a  total  of  2736 
puzzles, finding 23,440 words.  Participants were asked to report 
their current location, and 309 participants identified 19 different 
countries.  The majority (83.9%) was from the United States, and 
the  next  four  highest  responding  countries  were  India  (4.8%), 
Philippines (2.5%), Canada (1.9%), and United Kingdom (1.3%). 
Of  the  303  ages  reported,  the  average  was  34.6  years  and  the 
median age was 32 years.  Participants were again given a choice 
of income levels to report, and of the 303 reporting, 6.8% reported 
an income less than $7000, 30.7% reported an income between $7 
- $30k, 40.8% reported an income between $30 - $70k, 19.7% 
reported an income between $70 - $160k, and 1.9% reported an 
income  greater  than  $160k.  These  self-reported  descriptive 
statistics,  in  other  words,  were  generally  consistent  with  those 
from  Study  1,  which  encourages  us  to  believe  that  they  are 
reliable. A striking difference with Study 1, however, was that of 
the  290  participants  who  reported  their  gender  74.1%  were 
female,  as  opposed  to  58.8%.  Although  we  can  only  speculate 
about the reason for this disparity, one possible explanation is the 
task itself—that is, women may enjoy completing word puzzles 
more than men, whereas image sorting is more equally appealing 
(or  unappealing)  to  both  genders.    If  true,  the  importance  of 
intrinsic  enjoyment  in  task  selection  raises  the  concern  from 
earlier  that  it  may  also  undermine  the  impact  of  financial 
incentives on task completion—a concern that as we show next, 
appears to be valid.   
4.2  Results 
As with the first experiment, we found that effort-contingent pay 
motivated participants to do more work: participants who were 
paid  either  on  a  quota  or  a  piece-rate  basis  completed  more 
puzzles (Figure 6) and found more words than participants who 
were not paid, F(2,303) = 8.72, p < 0.001.  Looking within the 
two  compensation  schemes,  however,  we  found  no  significant 
impact  of  compensation  on  quantity  of  work  (see  Figure  6, 
insets)—a notable difference from the previous experiment (per 
puzzle: F(2,108) = 0.71, ns; per word F(2,124) = 1.82, ns).  Why 
the level of compensation did not have an effect is not clear, but it 
is likely that intrinsic motivation may have played a larger role in 
this  task  than  the  previous  one,  as  indeed  is  indicated  by  the 
strong bias towards female participation. Even more striking, one 
participant in the unpaid condition spent five hours completing all 
24 puzzles, and found all but 2 words, for a total compensation of 
$0.10.   There was also a very strong relationship between the 
participants’ post-hoc rating of their enjoyment of the task and the 
number of puzzles they completed, F(5,299) = 11.06, p<0.001; 
those who enjoyed it the most completed 19.3 puzzles on average, 
compared to the 6.2 puzzles completed by those who only enjoyed 
Figure 6. Participants who were paid for each puzzle 
completed or word found completed significantly more 
puzzles than those who did not receive contingent pay. Insets 
show number of puzzles completed did not differ by pay, 
within per-puzzle (left) or per-word (right) schemes. 
 
. 
 
  SIGKDD Explorations SIGKDD Explorations Volume 11, Issue 2 Page 105it a little.  Presumably, therefore, at least some participants found 
the  task  intrinsically  enjoyable,  thus  diminishing  the  impact  of 
extrinsic  motivation.    Nevertheless,  it  remained  the  case  that 
paying participants to work generated more work than not paying 
them,  suggesting  that  although  extrinsic  motivation  play  a  less 
important than in task 1, it remains relevant to output.    
Given this weaker relationship between pay and quantity of work, 
it  is  not  surprising  that  we  again  found  that  the  level  of 
compensation  had  no  significant  effect  on  the  quality  of 
performance—measured  here  as  the  fraction  of  total  possible 
words  found  per  puzzle—within  either  scheme.  This  was  true 
whether we fit the participants’ average accuracies across puzzles 
using an ANOVA, or fit the data to a hierarchical linear model 
(Eq.  1)  that  accounted  for  the  variability  in  difficulty  across 
puzzles  and  number  of  puzzles  completed  (see  Table  2A  & 
2B).What  was  surprising,  however,  was  that  the  compensation 
scheme itself had a large effect on accuracy. Figure 7 (solid line) 
shows  the  per-word  equivalent  pay  for  the  three  payment 
schemes: no pay ($0.008 per word); per puzzle (average of $0.011 
per word); and per-word ($0.025 per word).  Participants in the 
“pay-per-word”  condition,  in  other  words,  earned  roughly  four 
times as much per word, on average, as participants in the “pay-
per-puzzle”  condition.  Intuitively,  therefore,  one  would  expect 
that participants being paid per-word would find more words per 
puzzle than those being paid per puzzle, who would in turn find 
more words than those not being paid at all.  As Figure 7 (dashed 
line)  shows,  however,  the  actual  ranking  was  precisely  the 
opposite:  participants  who  did  not  receive  any  contingent  pay 
found the most words per puzzle on average (85.6%), while those 
paid per puzzle found the next highest (84.7%), and those paid per 
word found the least (81.4%).  
4.3  Discussion 
 Although  counterintuitive,  the  higher  work-to-pay  ratio  for  the 
per-puzzle condition is consistent with previous work [25], which 
has  found  that  quota  systems  (analogous  to  our  per-puzzle 
condition)  elicit  more  effort  than  piece-rates  (i.e.  per-word 
payment). Following this work, we note that the presence of a 
quota may elicit work in two ways: first, by encouraging greater 
marginal  effort  for  hard-to-find  words  that  may  complete  a 
puzzle;  and  second,  through  implicit  goal  setting  (i.e.  where 
completing the puzzle becomes, in effect, a more salient goal).  In 
other  words,  those  in  the  pay-per-word  condition  may  have 
chosen to advance to the next puzzle when the perceived marginal 
difficulty of finding the next word in the current puzzle became 
too great.  We note, however, that participants tendency to skip 
words was not affected by increasing pay, as one would expect if 
they  were  making  a  rational  tradeoff  between  time  and 
compensation.  The  main  impact  of  the  different  compensation 
schemes therefore seems to be psychological, not economic. 
Emphasizing this last point, we found a similar anchoring effect 
with respect to perceived value of the work that we identified in 
the  first  experiment  (Figs.  9A  &  9B).  Unlike  in  the  first 
experiment, however, we also asked participants who received no 
contingent pay to estimate the value of each puzzle or each word.  
Surprisingly, these uncompensated participants perceived the task 
to  be  worth  more  than  what  those  paid  the  lowest  non-zero 
amount perceived it to be worth, but less than those at the highest 
compensation level. Although at face value this result seems to 
contradict previous results showing that unpaid volunteers exert 
more effort than those paid a low wage [12], the difference can be 
explained  by  considering  the  expectations  of  the  participants.  
When  there  is  no  expectation  of  financial  reward,  effort  is 
motivated  by  other  kinds  of  (e.g.,  social)  rewards;  but  when 
monetary compensation is expected, as in the AMT framework, 
the  anticipated  financial  value  of  the  effort  will  be  the  driving 
mechanism.  To  summarize,  therefore,  we  find  although  paid 
workers generally did more work than unpaid workers, how they 
were paid had a larger impact on their output and accuracy than 
how much they were paid.  Moreover, paying workers a low rate 
led to them to perceive their work as less valuable than not paying 
them at all. 
5.  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In  this  paper,  we  have  investigated  the  relationship  between 
financial incentives and performance in the novel setting of online 
peer production systems. Our main findings are twofold: first, we 
found  that  increased  payments  increased  the  quantity  of  work 
performed,  but  not  its  quality;  and  second,  that  the  particular 
design  of  the  compensation  scheme  (a  quota  scheme  versus  a 
piece rate, for example) can have a significant effect on quality, 
2B  Model estimate  β ( )  95% Confidence Interval 
$0.01  -0.022  (-0.0464, 0.0027) 
$0.02  0.036  (0.015, 0.056) 
$0.03  -0.014  (-0.0357, 0.0075) 
2A  Model estimate  β ( )  95% Confidence Interval 
$0.01  -0.046  (-0.066, -0.027) 
$0.05  0.036  (0.016, 0.056) 
$0.10  0.01  (-0.01, 0.03) 
Table 2. Average parameter estimates for the effect of pay 
in the hierarchical linear model across users when A) paid 
per puzzle; and B) paid per word. 
 
. 
 
 
Figure 7. Participants were paid more in total (solid line) 
but found fewer words per puzzle (dashed line) in the pay 
per-word condition than in the pay per-puzzle condition.  
 
. 
 
 
SIGKDD Explorations SIGKDD Explorations Volume 11, Issue 2 Page 106even to the point where better work can be accomplished for less 
pay. A key psychological element to understanding these results 
appears to be that individuals anchor their perception of what they 
should be paid directly off of what they are being paid.  Moreover, 
when  they  are  not  being  paid  anything,  they  have  nothing  to 
anchor on, leading to a surprising non-monotonic relation between 
actual pay and perceived value. Although a number of our results 
do  seem  sensitive  to  the  specific  nature  of  the  task  (e.g.  the 
dependency of quantity on pay rate), this anchoring effect seems 
to be robust, suggesting that it may be quite general. 
These  results  may  have  implications  for  would-be  employers 
wishing to take advantage of crowd-sourcing platforms like AMT.  
First, when it is possible to use non-financial rewards, such as 
harnessing intrinsic motivation [2], the quality of the work will be 
as good or better than using financial rewards, and therefore work 
can be accomplished as effectively for little to no cost.  Second, 
when  it  is  not  possible  to  incentivize  work  through  intrinsic 
motivation (i.e., enjoyable tasks) or through social rewards, it may 
be in the employer’s best interest to offer as little as possible—
assuming, of course, a large enough crowd exists to make up for 
the diminished quantity of individual output the low pay would 
garner. Offering greater reward, in other words, may get the work 
done faster, but not better. 
To what extent these findings generalize beyond the web-specific 
context of crowd sourcing is more speculative, in part because of 
the  subject  pool  and  pay  rate  issues  raised  earlier,  and  in  part 
because our experimental design skirts some important aspects of 
financial  incentives  systems  that  have  been  studied  elsewhere.  
For  instance,  it  may  be  the  case  that  financial  incentives  exert 
much  of  their  impact  through  sorting  effects  [8]—that  is,  by 
offering  higher  wages  or  pay  that  is  tied  to  performance, 
employers attract and retain better workers. Because we allocate 
individuals  randomly  to  different  pay  conditions,  we  cannot 
observe any such effects. In addition, discussions about incentives 
often focus on the contrast between fixed wages and performance-
based  pay;  yet  because  our  experiment  considers  only  the 
differences  between  various  performance-based  pay  conditions, 
our  results  are  silent  on  this  important  issue.    Obviously,  we 
omitted these effects deliberately in order to focus on the simpler 
and more specific issue of variable pay rates; however, the narrow 
focus also increases the difficulty of finding analogues in realistic, 
offline contexts—that is, cases where indistinguishable workers 
are paid different rates to do the same work.   
Acknowledging the speculative nature of the exercise, however, 
one provocative analog is the observation that chief executives in 
Europe  are  paid  considerably  less  than  their  American 
counterparts  [26].  It  is  hard  to  argue  that  this  disparity  exists 
because Europeans are less talented, work less hard, or that their 
performance is systematically worse. Rather, it appears to derive 
instead from historical differences in cultural norms, which have 
the effect of setting an “anchor,” relative to which individuals are 
judging the value of their work. Analogous to what we see in our 
experiments,  it  appears  that  the  particular  value  of  the  anchor 
itself  has  little  effect  on  individual  performance—a  point  that 
might also be made about the well-documented pay gap between 
male  and  female  workers  in  the  US  [27]  which  again  appears 
uncorrelated with actual performance. Finally, a recent study of 
US  Federal  circuit  judges  found  that  in  spite  of  considerable 
variation  in  salary  across  different  states,  performance  bore  no 
systematic relation to compensation [28], suggesting once again 
that  absolute  pay  rates  are  less  important  to  performance  than 
perceptions of relative value. 
In addition to these real world analogs, we have already noted that 
our  results  bear  considerable  resemblance  to  previous 
experimental  findings  that  have  been  obtained  in  physical 
laboratories where the sums of money at stake were considerably 
larger than in our case (albeit still small compared with pay in 
traditional labor markets).  In particular, it has been shown that 
increased  financial  compensation  tends  to  yield  more,  but  not 
better work [24], and that quota systems can outperform piece-
rates [25]—similar to our findings regarding per-word and per-
puzzle payments in Study 2.  Although many more experiments of 
the kind we have described here would be needed to make firm 
generalizations, therefore, these results do at least suggest that the 
principles  relating  compensation  and  performance  may  be 
sufficiently  general  to  span  very  different  contexts  and 
Figure 9. Perceived value of completing a puzzle (left) or a word (right) as reported in a post-task survey relative to the actual 
pay received.  Participants anchored on the value earned, and on average valued the task slightly greater than the amount 
received. When not given task-contingent pay, participants had no anchor and perceived the value of a task to be higher than 
those receiving the lowest contingent pay. 
 
. 
 
 
SIGKDD Explorations SIGKDD Explorations Volume 11, Issue 2 Page 107compensation levels, and thus can be investigated usefully even 
when payments are very small.   
Finally, we note that the fast and economical nature of AMT may 
make it of interest to behavioral scientists more generally, as an 
environment  for  conducting  behavioral  studies  and  experiments 
[22].  Naturally,  only  web-based  studies  can  make  use  of  this 
approach,  ruling  out  those  that  require  in-person  interactions, 
physiological measurements, and so on; however, many studies of 
interest could be run online, including surveys [29], reaction time 
studies  [30],  group  interaction  studies  [31]  and  categorization 
experiments  [32].    Clearly  web-based  approaches  also  present 
novel  challenges  associated  with  recruitment  bias,  participant 
dropout, etc. [33]; however, we are optimistic that these issues can 
be addressed, and in some respects the web permits broader and 
more  representative  participation  than  the  traditional  pool  of 
university students. Crowd-sourcing, in other words, is not only 
an interesting phenomenon in management and business [4], but 
could become a useful tool for studying questions of interest to 
behavioral and social scientists as well. 
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